FOUR ALTERNATIVE POLICIES TO RESTORE BALANCE OF PAYhfENTS EQUILIBRIUM-A COMMENT AND AN EXTENSION
THE ARTICLE published by one of the authors' on alternative policies to restore balance of payments equilibrium needs some correction and may be somewhat generalized.
1. A first correction has to be made with respect to the conditions,'
which, in the case of discriminatory (positive) duties, D', D2, and D3
have to satisfy in order that positive duties are found. I t was stated that (A1 -A2),(A1 -A3),and (A2-A3)had to be positive, from which was deduced the condition: D3 > -50'. I t will, however, be clear that only the signs of the tij's matter. If we express these t's in D', D2, and D3 with the help of (5.3), (5.4), (5.7), and (5.8), we find:
I t will be evident that t12 and tZ3are always positive since D2 < D3 and D1 < 0,whereas t13is only positive if D3 > -D2/5, a condition less stringent than the one mentioned in the article.
2. On the same page we find a computation of tji for the case where, for every country i, tm' = 0 (i # m). Since in the set of equations,
where s"' = t'" -A j + An and a = l/(m -l), no terms with snnoccur,
(Am/2) (and not tji = A j -A,, as was stated in the article).
3. Similarly, we find in the case of both tm-lviand tm'iequal to zero (i # m -1, m):
4. A generalization may be given with respect to the welfare function used. This was supposed to be the unweighted sum of the welfare func- By means of an analysis similar to the one used in the article we find, in the case of discriminatory import duties and subsidies (Section 4), the following set of equations for the macro-model:
from which we deduce As in the article, we can divide the equations into m groups (each of m -1 equations), in each of which only the duties levied by one country appear.
Equations (4.20) (the side conditions) remain unchanged. There appears to be no loss in international trade, whereas the change in consumption (? is likewise equal to the initial balance of payments deficit Di.
Considering the micro-model we find:
Thus, the value of t i i appears to be independent of k, a result similar to the one found in the article.
In the case of discriminatory (positive) duties (Section 5) we can try to find a solution in the same way as in the article, by supposing that Xi $ wi fulfills the condition (A1 + wl) 1 (A2 + wz) 1 . . . 2 (A, + a,) and by putting equal to zero all t"' s with "falling" indices (i > j).
For the nth country we find the following set of n -1 equations:
where uin = antin-(Xi f wi) + (An + w,) and , and
3
If we consider the signs of the t's, it appears that t13 is positive under the condition while 1' ' and tZ3are always positive (Dl < 0 and D2 < D 3 ) .
The loss in international trade is here also equal to D3, whereas ci = In the cases of nondiscriminatory import duties and devaluation (Sections 6 and 7, respectively) the results of the article are not changed by the introduction of the w's, since the m -1 side conditions are sufficient to determine them -1 variables, there being no room for maximizing W.
As a check on our generalized formulae we may put w = 1, which in fact leads us back to the old formulae.
Concluding, we may state that the introduction of the w' s does not profoundly change the results of the article: the criteria proposed in Section 3 (the loss in international trade, the burden on the countries, and the stability conditions) retain the same values as before.
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